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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988, recall assumed a central role in the Arizona political pro-
cess. Arizona voters expressed their overwhelming disapproval of
Governor Evan Mecham. Mecham's tenure in office was punctuated
by a variety of controversial activities1 making it difficult even for
1. Some of the controversy has centered around his comment that "blacks them-
selves refer to their children as pickaninnies." Other indiscretions included his
statement that Martin Luther King's holiday should be cancelled "because he
should not be elevated into that category." Mechawm Vote Me Out Or I Stay,
Dallas Times Herald, Jan. 31, 1988, at Al, col. 2. Many of the Mecham offenses
have been parodied in the comic strip, Doonesbury. See Trudeau, Doonesbury,
Nov.-Jan. 1987-88 passim.
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party loyalists to support him.2
In a well organized recall drive, supporters of Mecham's ouster
gathered 388,988 signatures, nearly twice the necessary minimum. 3
Mecham Recall Committee founder Ed Buck told a rally: "We may be
a ragtag group of volunteers, but we're no dummies .... I think we are
a real illustration of democracy in action,"' said Naomi Howard, an-
other recall committee leader.4
While recall in Arizona was being used for its intended purpose-
permitting the voters to correct an electoral mistake-recall statutes
also have been abused. For example, mayors in Nebraska's cities and
villages need not worry about overstaying their welcome; if the voters
tire of them they will simply recall them from office. Sherilyn Moore,
the mayor of Ashland, a small town approximately twenty miles from
Lincoln, recently faced a recall drive.5 The sponsor of the recall peti-
tion was the former mayor of Ashland, Max D. Barnes, who refused to
announce any reasons for the recall. When she learned of the cam-
paign against her, Moore commented that "it's very unfair to people
such as myself to have this process started and sit here not knowing
why."6 The signature drive ended a month later with 297 signatures
submitted. Thirty-five of the signatures were found to be invalid,
dropping the number below the 271 necessary to hold a recall election.
Moore said that she was relieved at the results and now will turn her
attention back to city business.7 Moore is just one of the seemingly
endless number of local government officials who have been the target
of recall drives in Nebraska.
The recall frenzyS in Nebraska began in early 1987 when Omaha
Mayor Mike Boyle was recalled. Overwhelmingly reelected to his post
in 1985, Boyle was regarded as a likely Democratic contender for gov-
ernor.9 The proponents of the recall, a group called "Citizens for a
Mature Leadership," argued that his erratic behavior, including out-
bursts of temper and a vendetta against his own police department,
embarrassed the city. In particular, they focused on the Mayor's dis-
missal of the police chief after he refused to sign discipline papers
2. The state Republican Party chairman, Burton Kruglick stated- "There is no ques-
tion that this is damaging to the party." Arizona Governor Blasts Political Oppor-
tunists, The Boston Globe, Jan. 10, 1988, at 2, col. 2.
3. 388,988 Signatures Filed for Arizona Governor's Recall, The Boston Globe, Nov.
3, 1987, at 5, col. 3.
4. Id.
5. Regional News/Nebraska, United Press International, Jan. 18, 1988.
6. Id.
7. Regional News/Nebraska, United Press International, Feb. 10, 1988.
8. Carr, Voters Target Nebraska Local Offwials in Recall Frenzy, Dallas Morning
News, Aug. 9, 1987, at A6, col. 1.
9. Robbins, Omaha Mayor Battling on the Eve of Recall, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13,1987, at
A16, col. 1.
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against officers involved in the drunk driving arrest of Boyle's
brother-in-law.1o But even members of the committee who sought his
recall acknowledged that "[Boyle's] administration had run the city
well."II
The Mayor's supporters asked that such mistakes be overlooked.
However, even the local paper, The Omaha World Herald supported
an ouster.12 When asked why he had not resigned rather than face
recall, the Mayor stated: "The only reason I stand for it is because if I
let them win, the result would be anarchy. If a mayor looked cross-
eyed at somebody, somebody would start a recall. I've just got to stand
up to it."13 But his efforts were unsuccessful, and right or wrong,
fifty-six percent of nearly 100,000 ballots were cast in favor of
removal.14
For all of 1987, the voters of Nebraska had the final say. In 1987,
recall efforts were mounted against almost forty public officials.15
There had been only eleven recall attempts in 1985 and 1986 com-
bined. The recall frenzy has created some unusual politics. For exam-
ple, a town council member in Loup City escaped his own recall when
he was appointed to replace a recalled mayor.'6 In Wymore, the
mayor faced a recall over his appointment of a utilities department
employee. Apparently, he chose not to campaign during the recall
drive, stating that he did not want to change the will of the voter.
Nevertheless, he kept his post.17
Similarly, two mayors were recalled in a thirty-seven day period in
Alliance, Nebraska. Mayor Dick Vellaha was recalled in December
1987 for "misusing city stationery and facilities, for harassing the po-
lice department, failing to conduct meetings in a dignified and orderly
manner and for actions bringing ridicule to the city."' 8 His successor,
Duane Worley, was recalled in January 1988 based on allegations that
he had not honored a request to lower electricity rates.19 Richard
Robb, a car salesman, is the current mayor, a purely ceremonial job
10. Omaha Votes To Oust Its Mayor Over Conduct, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14,1987, at A15,
col. 1.
11. Robbins, Removal of Omaha Mayor Stirs Pride and Sadness, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15,
1987, at A14, col. 1.
12. "We believe a pattern of conduct exists that justifies a vote for the recall of Mayor
Boyle." Pattern of Mayor's Conduct Justiftes Vote to Recall Him, Omaha World
Herald, Jan. 11, 1987, at 1A, col. 1.
13. Robbins, supra note 9.
14. Omaha has population of approximately 340,000 people.
15. Carr, supra note 8.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Regional News/Nebraska, United Press International, Nov. 13, 1987.
19. Day, Town 'Polarized' By Divisive Recall Elections, Associated Press, Feb. 13,
1988.
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that pays only $575 per year.20 "I think the key word for Alliance at
this point is 'polarized,"' said Kevin Horn, executive director of the
Alliance Chamber of Commerce.21
The rash of recalls has resurrected the political debate over demo-
cratic government. "What we're saying here is that maybe the public
isn't always right," explained Robert Sittig, a political science profes-
sor at The University of Nebraska-Lincoln. "That's a tough thing to
do in a democratic society, but even the public makes a mistake
sometimes." 22
This comment will focus on the conflict between the will of the
electorate and the smooth functioning of government. The comment
will suggest reforms that will ease the tension between the desires of
the people and the need for an effective, efficient government. The
first section will review the history of the recall. While recall cer-
tainly has not paved the way to a democratic utopia as its most ardent
supporters once suggested, it has served, on some level, to create a
body of elected officials who are more responsive to the concerns of
the public at large.
The second section will analyze state recall statutes. In so doing,
this paper will explore whether recall has gone beyond its effective
role of permitting the electorate to remove from office self-serving
and unfaithful public servants. Furthermore, it will assess the threat
that unrestrained recall will bring effective government to a virtual
standstill. The third section will analyze the recall reform bills con-
sidered by the Nebraska Legislature. The final section of the paper
will include suggestions for recall reform, including a model recall
statute. These proposals will attempt to reinforce recall as a potent
political device while limiting its susceptibility to abuse.
II. HISTORY
A. Colonial America
The ideas of direct participation in government and of recall are
not entirely new to the American political process. Early American
colonials exercised direct democracy in the form of town meetings.
The meetings were comprised of all the town men who dealt with is-
sues by consensus.2 3
This tadition of direct democracy led to a movement for recall
provisions in both the Articles of Confederation and the United States
Constitution. An early draft of the Articles of Confederation con-
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Carr, supra note 8.
23. See generally Swan, The Use of the Recall in the United States, in THE IN1TIATIV,
REFERENDuM & RECALL (W. Munro ed. 1912).
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tained a recall provision.24 Moreover, the framers considered includ-
ing a recall provision in the Constitution. Some Federal Convention
delegates opposed the final draft of the Constitution because it failed
to include the recall.25 However, the recall was a hotly debated
topic,26 with every state convention engaged in the recall controversy.
For example, at the New York State Convention, Alexander Hamilton
and John Livingston fought vehemently over the recall, particularly
the recall of senators.X
B. Progressive Era Politics
Modern recall, along with its sisters, the referendum and initiative,
form the great triumvirate of popular government. The reformers of
the Progressive Era initiated the three reforms at the local govern-
ment level because they believed that government representatives
failed to serve the public as mandated by the Constitution.28 The
Progressives perceived that the allegiance of their public officials lay
at the feet of party bosses and political machines rather than with the
public at large.29 And it was true that local governments of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century America seemed controlled
not by the electorate, but by a few large corporations of the newly
industrialized United States. Against this backdrop, the great triumvi-
rate was conceived to reform the political process by bringing "the
people" back into the process of lawmaking.3 0 "The people," reasoned
the Progressives, would be the guardians of the public interest and
would not seek to further purely private, corporate interests.3 1
The initiative and referendum were called a supplement to repre-
sentative democracy because they enabled the people to participate di-
rectly in the legislative functions of the local government. The recall,
meanwhile, functioned as a type of guarantee to the people that they
would not be forced to live with their mistakes:
In particular, the recall express[ed] the idea that a public office is so vitally
24. Proposed Article V of the Articles of Confederation stated-. "For the more conve-
nient management of the general interests of the United States, delegates shall
be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct,
to meet in Congress on the first Monday of November in every year with a power
reserved in each state to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within
the year and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year." Id. at
298 n.2.
25. Luther Martin of Maryland was one such delegate. Id.
26. For a discussion of the "pros" and "cons" of recall, see infra notes 28-58 and ac-
companying text.
27. Swan, supra note 23, at 298 n.2.
28. See generally, F. BiRD & F. RYAN, THE RECALL OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ch. 1 (1930).
29. Id.
30. See generally IL HOFsrADTEP, THE AGE OF REFORM FROM BRYAN TO FDR 257-68
(1955).
31. F. BIRD & F. RYAN, supra note 28, at 8.
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affected with the public interest that when its occupant ceases to perform his
duties to the interests of the community his official tenure may be terminated.
The recall is based on the theory that the people must maintain a more direct
and elastic control over their elected officials.3 2
However, the reforms were not only for the benefit of the political
process. It was hoped that by permitting "the people" to be a part of
the workings of the political process, "the people" could become more
productive citizens as well.33
But not everyone supported these political reforms. Those who op-
posed recall condemned it as leading to the destruction of democracy.
Some were convinced that an uneducated electorate would commit
political suicide by arbitrarily calling for recall.3 4 And even if the ac-
tual workings of the representative government were not completely
impaired by the will of the people, the government would no longer
represent a majority. Instead, a minority of citizens would demand
recall elections. Because of this, some feared that "only a small per-
centage of the voters [would] take the trouble to register their will" by
voting.3 5 Finally, the opposition insisted that these elections not only
would constitute minority rule but also would be very expensive and
time consuming. To many citizens, the general elections alone were
too expensive and disruptive to everyday life. The potential for even
more elections was just too much.36
The City of Los Angeles adopted the first recall provision in 1903.37
Like so many cities of the day, Los Angeles was controlled by special
interests. In particular, city politics were dominated by the Southern
Pacific Railroad.3 8 Because the Progressives were determined to end
the control that the Railroad had over the city, they made an effort to
revise the city charter to require greater responsiveness by the city's
politicians. Under the tutelage of Dr. John R. Haynes,3 9 a noted local
32. Swan, supra note 23, at 298.
33. Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1347, 1348 (1985).
34. D. WiLcox, GovERNMENT BY ALL THE PEoPLE 247-55 (1912).
35. Id. at 235.
36. Even now, people are concerned with the cost of special elections. For example,
Nebraska is debating provisions that would allow a majority of a board (such as a
school board) to face recall without a quorum of the board in office in order to
keep special election costs to a minimum.
37. While recall was not officially incorporated into government documents until
1903, it had been a part of the national platform of the Socialist Labor Party in
both 1892 and 1896.
38. See generally R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 30.
39. F. BIRD & F. RYAN, supra note 28, at 24.
Dr. Haynes came to Los Angeles in 1887 from Philadelphia. A busy man
of abundant means, broad culture, and wide acquaintance, with many
interests in life in addition to a large medical practice, he nevertheless
found time to go into politics, not through any desire for public office,
but for the promotion of certain measures which he believed would place
government more firmly in the hands of the people.
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government reformer, the city council called an election to select a
board of freeholders to carry out this objective. 40
The board, along with the press, undertook the considerable task
of educating the public on the initiative, the referendum, and the re-
call. While the initiative and the referendum were somewhat familiar
political institutions, the recall was
something new .... The supporters of the innovation point out that there is
now no way in which people themselves can secure the removal of any official
before the expiration of his time no matter how bad his record might be. This-
plan is yet to be approved by the people and it is impossible to say how it will
work until it is tried. It is not likely that there will be frequent removals of
officials by this method, but the very fact that they could be so removed would
doubtless have a salutary influence. 4 1
As proof of this supposed "salutary influence," supporters noted that
the recall could be used as a constant "reminder of pre-election
promises," encouraging officials to retain a candidate's state of mind.42
Nevertheless, the recall faced opposition because of its feared per-
vasive influence. Unlike the referendum and the initiative, the people
realized that the recall was not purely a legislative operation. The re-
call was not a method of instituting desirable laws; it could subject
elected officials to the continuous and arbitrary will of the people.
Moreover, repeated recalls could slow, if not stop, an effective govern-
ment. Because no elected official would be immune from recall, some
believed that recall could affect all facets of government and lead to
chaos.43
But the board of freeholders never had the opportunity to submit
its new charter to the people. The California Supreme Court deter-
mined that the board of freeholders was an illegal body because the
city charter allowed for its own change only at two year intervals by
an amendment process.44 Thus, in 1902, a new and legal charter revi-
sion commission was founded to propose amendments to the city char-
ter.45 Although not a member of this new commission, Dr. Haynes
was able to secure approval for the inclusion of the initiative, the ref-
erendum, and the recall.
The battle for voter support was waged in the press where editori-
40. Id. at 23-24.
41. The Los Angeles Herald, Oct. 3,1900, quoted in F. BIRD & F. RYAN, supra note 28,
at 27 n.6.
42. Munro, Introductory, in THE INiTIATrvE, REFERENDUM & RECALL, supra note 23,
at 46.
43. See generally D. WILCOX, supra note 34, at 169-76.
44. Blanchard v. Hartwell, 131 Cal. 263, 63 P. 349 (1900). Specifically, the court said
that "the payment of the expenses of a board of freeholders elected by a city
already having a freehold charter, to prepare a new charter, will be enjoined
since such city can only change the charter by the procedure provided for making
amendments." Id.
45. F. BIRD & F. RYAN, supra note 28, at 28.
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als either praised direct democracy or warned against the general
havoc that would ensue if the general electorate possessed the power
of recall. Those who supported it preached that the "intended purpose
[of recall] was to render public officials more mindful of their position
as 'trustees and servants of the public' by making them continuously,
rather than periodically, responsible to the popular will."46 Recall op-
ponents argued that it would be used for personal and partisan pur-
poses by petty factions. The voters eventually approved the recall
amendment by a four to one margin.47
At last, it seemed, the right to elect had a complement- the right
to recall.48 When the Los Angeles city council voted to award the
city's printing contract to an anti-union newspaper with an overly ex-
pensive bid, the recall had its first public trial.49 City labor leaders
successfully recalled a councilman who had voted for the award de-
spite the large concentration of unionized laborers in his district. The
recall found such favor with the citizens of California that twenty-five
other municipalities introduced recall provisions into their charters by
1911.50
In 1908, Oregon became the first state to add a recall amendment to
its constitution. One year later, the citizens of Junction City, Oregon
recalled their mayor. Within seven years, seventeen recall elections
had been held.51 The recall became instantly popular, and ten other
states followed Oregon's lead in less than a decade.52
The history of the recall provision in the Arizona Constitution
demonstrates the popularity of the recall in the first quarter of the
twentieth century. In 1910, at the Arizona Constitutional Convention,
the drafters of the state constitution adopted the initiative, the refer-
endum, and the recall. The recall provision provided for the removal
of judges as well as other officials. President Taft threatened to veto
Arizona's admission to the United States unless the judicial recall pro-
vision was removed from its constitution.53 Similarly, Congress passed
46. Id. at 93.
47. Id. at 32 n.11. 9,779 votes were cast in favor of the recall, and 2,469 against it.
48. Swan, supra note 23, at 306.
49. F. BIRD & F. RYAN, supra note 28, at 227.
50. Among them were San Francisco, Pasadena, Fresno, San Bernadino, San Diego,
and Santa Monica. See infra note 53.
51. J. BARNETT, THE OPERATION OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL IN
OREGON 201 (1915). At the time, many incorrect statements were given about the
frequency of the use of recall. For example, the Governor stated- "'There has
never been an official recalled in this state." Governor's Message, Oregon Sen. J.
1030 (1913), reprinted in J. BARNETT, supra, at 202 n.1.
52. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 13; ARIZ. CONST. art. VIII, pt.1 § 1; COLO. CONST. art. XXI,
§ 1; IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 6; NEv. CONST. art. H, § 9; WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 33;
MICH. CONST. art. II, § 8; KAN. CONsT. art. IV, § 3; LA. CONST. art. X, § 26 (for-
merly art. IX, § 9); N.D. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
53. H. LAMAR, THE FAR SOuTHwEsT 1846-1912, A TERRiTORIAL HISTORY 504 (1966).
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a resolution requiring Arizona to remove the provision before becom-
ing a state.54 Arizona complied, but soon after it was admitted to
statehood, the Arizona Legislature passed an amendment providing
for judicial recall.55
Despite its immediate popularity, the recall movement came to a
virtual standstill by 1924.56 Nevertheless, today all but nine states
have some form of recall,57 however limited it may be. No state that
adopted the recall has since abandoned it, perhaps because many vot-
ers would be skeptical of an elected official's attempt to take the re-
moval power away from the people.58
III. A LOOK AT RECALL STATUTES
Recall statutes vary widely but generally take the same three-part
form. First, voters interested in seeking a recall must circulate a peti-
tion.5 9 Second, election officials review the petition within a statuto-
rily- or constitutionally-required period of time and determine
whether the petition has the requisite number of legally sufficient sig-
natures.60 Finally, if the election officials determine that the petition
and signatures are sufficient, a recall election is held.61 In addition,
many recall statutes require that the elected official be in office a spec-
ified length of time before a recall petition may be circulated.62 Simi-
larly, these statutes require that public officials not be subject to recall
within a certain time period before the expiration of their term.6 3
A. Types of Recall Statutes
1. No Specifiw Restrictions
Recall provisions fall into three general categories. The first type
54. S. CON. RES. 8, 37 Stat. 42 (1911).
55. Other states such as Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.470 (1988); Idaho, IDAHO CODE
§ 34-1701 (1972); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4301 (1986); Louisiana, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18:1300.1 (Supp. 1988), and Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 29.82.010 (1982) specifically exclude judges from recall.
56. The LaFollette campaign of 1924 had Progressive orientation but the recall was
largely ignored. See generally R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 30, at 257-68.
57. Alabama, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania,
Utah, and Vermont.
58. This does not mean that legislators are unwilling to initiate recall reform. See
infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 100.361(1)(a) (1985).
60. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 306.035 (1987).
61. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1405 (1988). But see ARiz. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1,
§ 4, which provides for a special election that includes candidates' names along
with the targeted official's name. If the targeted official does not receive the most
votes, he or she is no longer in office, and the candidate with the most votes is
declared the new officer.
62. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.490 (1982).
63. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4305 (1986).
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of recall provision does not place specific restrictions on the reason for
the recall.64 Under this standard, a public official may be recalled for
any reason. This type of statute envisions recall as a purely political
process that permits voters to register their will when a public offi-
cial's actions are unpopular. One journalist went so far as to suggest
that these recalls are begun "on an emotional whim as often as not."65
Recall battles under this type of statute have been waged over a
variety of interesting issues. For example, in 1924, Mayor Bridegroom
of Azusa, California nearly was recalled because he made "hilarious
comment[s] regarding the 'annual parade of the Portuguese Society
during the Pentecostal Celebration.' "66 "In 1981, the mayor of Para-
dise, California, had a recall filed against him because he ordered
parking banned on the city's main thoroughfare during the city's an-
nual Gold Nugget Day's Parade."6 7 Particularly in California, it seems
that every high-profile official is a target for recall, whether arbitrary
or not.
6 8
2. Clear Statement Requirement
The second type of recall statute differs from the first only in that
it requires a brief but clear statement of the reason for the recall.6 9
The reason must be based upon acts or conduct of the official while in
office. As with states in the first category, the reasons for recall are
not reviewable by the courts.70
Westpy v. Burnett,71 a New Jersey Superior Court decision, pro-
vides a good example of the second type of recall provision and of a
court's hands-off, no-review policy. In Westpy, the targeted officials
claimed that the recall statement did not properly specify the reason
for the recall. The statement read as follows: "[T]he conduct of the
mayor and two councilmen 'resulted in the usurpation of the functions
of the manager and the passage of ordinances of questionable legal
validity which are not in the best interests of the people of the
64. Currently, Nebraska's recall statute does not provide for any statement showing
cause. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 32-1401 to -1408 (1988).
65. Officials on a Tightrope, ECONOMIsT, April 16, 1983, at 46.
66. F. BirD & F. RYAN, supra note 28. Such ethnic jokes are not tolerated in the late
1980s either. Governor Evan Mecham, Republican, Arizona, was the target of a
recall drive based in part on a variety of ethnic jokes and slurs. See supra note 1.
67. Price, Recall at the Local Level, 72 NAT'L CMc REv. 200, 204 (April 1983).
68. For example, San Francisco Mayor Dianne Feinstein faced an unsuccessful recall
attempt, see It Could Happen Only In San Francisco, U.S. NEws & WoRLD RE-
PORT, May 9, 1983, at 17, and Chief Justice Rose Bird was not re-elected following
a strong campaign against her. See Wold & Culver, The Defeat of the California
Justices; The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability,
70 JUDICATURE, April-May 1987, at 348, 349.
69. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 78.260 (Vernon 1987).
70. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(a).
71. 82 N.J. SUPER 239, 197 A.2d 400 (1964), aff'd, 41 N.J. 554, 197 A.2d 857 (1964).
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community' .. ,,72
In analyzing the validity of the recall petition, the court remarked:
The courts throughout the United States have generally adopted the view that
the power granted to electors of a municipality to remove certain public of-
ficers through recall procedure is political in nature and that it is for the peo-
ple, and not the courts, to decide the truth and sufficiency of the grounds
asserted for removal. In most states, statutory and charter provisions as to
recall are liberally interpreted in favor of the electorate. This liberality is also
extended to the usually required statement or general statement "of the
grounds upon which the removal is sought."73
Based on this reasoning, the court concluded that this recall petition
did not warrant judicial interference.
Other state courts also have adopted this political deference to re-
call elections. In Abbey v. Green,74 the Supreme Court of Arizona up-
held a recall petition filed against a state judge which stated as one of
the grounds for removal that "he is not worthy of belief."75 Removing
itself from the political debate, the court concluded that "[i]t was the
evident purpose [of the drafters] to permit the electorate to get rid of
an obnoxious and unsatisfactory officer with whom, for any or no rea-
son whatever for that matter, they may have become displeased."78
Moreover, in Wallace v. Tripp,77 the Michigan Supreme Court
overruled its previous interpretation of the recall provision which had
permitted limited review. The court explained:
In 1926, in Newberg v. Donnelly, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the
... [recall provision], and read into it additional limitations: 'The reason or
reasons assigned must be based on some act, or failure to act which, in the
absence of a sufficient justification, would warrant the recall.' Without even
noting that both the Constitution and the statute clearly indicated that the
voters had the power to determine what reasons would warrant the recall, the
Court itself proceeded to hold certain acts described on the petition before it
as not 'a sufficient justification.' We cannot find any constitutional warrant
for this assumption of a power clearly reserved by the Constitution to the
people.7 8
The court concluded that "Michigan's Constitution and statute require
a clear statement of reasons for recall .... Beyond this, the Constitu-
tion reserves the power of recall to the people."79 Thus, the Michigan
court revested the power of the recall entirely with the people.
72. Id. at 242, 197 A.2d at 401-02.
73. Id. at 246, 197 A.2d at 404.
74. 28 Ariz. 53, 235 P. 150 (1925).
75. Id. at 62, 235 P. at 154.
76. Id. at 63, 235 P. at 154.
77. 358 Mich. 668, 101 N.W.2d 312 (1960).
78. Id. at 677, 101 N.W.2d at 313-14 (citation omitted)(quoting Newberg v. Donnelly,
235 Mich. 531, 534, 209 N.W. 572, 574 (1926)).
79. Id. at 680, 101 N.W.2d at 315.
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3. Recall for Misconduct: The Washington Example
The third type of recall provision specifies that an official may be
recalled only for misconduct. For example, the Montana recall statute
strictly defines the permissible grounds for recall. Officials may be
recalled only for "physical or mental lack of fitness, incompetence, vi-
olation of [the official's] oath of office, official misconduct, or convic-
tion of felony offense."8 0 The Montana Supreme Court declared that
recall is a "special, extraordinary, and unusual proceeding" and should
not be used except in extreme circumstances.8 1
Another example of strict recall provision is the Washington Con-
stitution, which provides that voters may recall an official for misfea-
sance or malfeasance during office, or for some violation of the
official's oath.82 Similarly, a Florida statute lists seven different kinds
of misconduct that warrant recall.8 3
In those states which require a showing of cause, the whim of the
electorate takes a backseat until the courts determine that the
grounds for recall are sufficient. Requiring a showing of cause pro-
tects the targeted official against arbitrary recall campaigns. Support-
ers of this strict form of recall claim that judicial review does not
destroy the political integrity of the recall.84 However, the opponents
of "recall for misconduct" fear that judicial intervention infringes on
the political process.8 5 Furthermore, critics underscore that the
"cause requirements" draw hazy distinctions due to the lack of a clear
definition for words like "misfeasance." They argue that excessive ju-
dicial intervention is certain when definitions are vague.
The history of the recall provision in Washington traces the chang-
ing role of judicial review of recall allegations when state recall provi-
sions require a showing of cause. Washington is one of only a few
states that require an allegation of misconduct.8 6 Moreover, Washing-
ton incorporated the provision into its constitution. "These require-
ments indicate that the drafters of Washington's recall provision
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-16-603(3) (1987).
81. State ex rel Palmer v. Hart, 201 Mont. 526, 530, 655 P.2d 965, 967 (1982).
82. WASH. CoNsT. art. I, § 33 (Amend. 8). The Washington Constitution is the only
constitution that requires a showing of cause for recall. Other states have cause
requirements, but the requirements are by statutory authority.
83. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.361(1)(b) (West 1982)("The grounds for removal of elected
municipal officials shall, for purposes of this act, be limited to the following: mal-
feasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, drunkenness, incompetence, permanent
inability to perform official duties, and conviction of a felony involving moral
turpitude").
84. See generally Cohen, Recall in Washington: A Time For Reform, 50 WASH. L.
REV. 29 (1974); See also, Brocek v. Bayley, 81 Wash. 2d 831, 505 P.2d 814 (1973)(en
banc)(Utter, J. concurring), overruled, Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280,287, 692
P.2d 799, 804 (1984).
85. See infra text accompanying notes 110-19.
86. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 29-82.10 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
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wanted to prevent recall elections from reflecting on the popularity of
the political decisions made by elected officers."87 In other words, the
drafters believed that the recall should not be used as an opportunity
to air opposition to a single issue; such single-issue orientation should
be reserved for the referendum or the next regular election. While
the 1913 Legislature approved the drafters' language by enacting the
"recall for misconduct" provision into a constitutional amendment, it
failed to define the operative words: "misfeasance;" "malfeasance;"
and "violation of the oath of office."88 Thus, the words have been in-
terpreted and reinterpreted by the state's courts.
Cudihee v. Phelps 89 was the first recall case to reach the Washing-
ton Supreme Court after ratification of the recall amendment. In up-
holding the lower court's denial of an injunction, the Washington
Supreme Court limited the role of the judiciary in the recall process to
determining the sufficiency of the statement of allegations.9 0 Such an
interpretation by the judiciary made Washington's requirement of
misconduct meaningless. The Cudihee court concluded that while the
state constitution permitted the court to deny a recall based on a lack
of cause, recall had to be reserved as a right of the people's political
process:
It may be that the courts have jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the
statement of the allegations made as cause for removal if presented in a
proper proceeding... but the trial of the question of whether such cause actu-
ally exists, and as to whether the officer is to be discharged is to be had before
the tribunal of the people .... 91
Adjusting its interpretation of the recall amendment just one year
later, in Pybus v. Smith, the Washington Supreme Court set bounda-
ries for the sufficiency of the recall allegation.92 Pybus, a council
member, was accused of bargaining with other council members con-
cerning how he would vote, thereby violating his duty to vote accord-
ing to his own good judgment. Rather than letting the people decide
the merits of the allegation, the court determined that the act did, in
fact, constitute malfeasance. 93
Unlike Cudihee, the Pybus court intervened in the manner sug-
gested by the constitution, yet still failed to define the terms by which
it was making its decision. Nevertheless, subsequent decisions used
Pybus as a starting point, and most concluded that malfeasance in-
87. See Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wash. 2d 268, 271, 693 P.2d 71, 72 (1984)(citing 4 E.
McQuILAvY, MuNiCiPAL CoapoIATioNs § 12.2516 (3d rev. ed. 1979)).
88. See id. at 271, 693 P.2d at 73.
89. 76 Wash. 314, 136 P. 367 (1913).
90. See generally Note, Constitutional Law-Recall of Public Officers: Discretionary
Acts Cannot Be A Sufficient Basis For Recall, 48 WASH. L. REv. 503, 506 (1973).
91. 76 Wash. 314, 331, 136 P. 367, 373 (1913).
92, 80 Wash. 65, 141 P. 203 (1914).
93. Id.
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volved acts which were at least misdemeanors.9 4 Thus, even though
Pybus failed to define the constitutional language, the holding pro-
vided support for later interpretations.
In 1968, the Washington Supreme Court, in State ex rel LaMon v.
Westport,95 created a two-part test for determining the sufficiency of
the recall allegations. The court held that the charges must allege
"malfeasance" or "misfeasance," and that the charges must be defi-
nite. By itself, this holding did not lead to new definitional enlighten-
ment. But the LaMon court cited State v. Miller96 to give more
precise meaning to the terms "misfeasance" and "malfeasance." The
Miller court stated: "[They] are comprehensive terms and include any
wrongful conduct that affects, interrupts, or interferes with the per-
formance of official duty."97 While this definition also was plagued by
a lack of precision, it provided a basic standard for determining the
sufficiency of recall allegations.
Four years later, in State ex rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bus-
sing v. Brooks,9 8 the court limited the Lamon definition of "malfea-
sance" by concluding that discretionary acts of a public official cannot
be considered a sufficient basis for recall. The rule created by Brooks
provides for decision making on an ad hoc basis and assumes that judi-
cial review will not destroy the integrity of the recall process but will
protect the system from abuse.
The foregoing cases, "in trying to interpret the right of recall, de-
veloped a narrow scope of review based on the court's traditional role
of nonintervention in political controversies." 99 The court created
case-by-case review, which necessarily requires some court interven-
tion, but limited the definitions so that voters and targeted officials
alike would be aware of exactly what reasons were a sufficient basis
for a recall petition. In spite of the revisions, through the early 1970s
94. See Thiemens v. Sanders, 102 Wash. 453, 458, 173 P. 26, 28 (1918)(Thiemens, as
chairman of the board of city commissioners, conspired to have certain land that
he owned purchased by the city for construction of the courthouse, thereby mak-
ing him guilty of a crime under Washington law).
95. 73 Wash. 2d 255, 438 P.2d 200 (1968), overruled, Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280,
692 P.Zd 799 (1984).
96. 32 Wash. 2d 149, 201 P.2d 136 (1948). In Miller, the court determined that a public
auditor's employment of his wife constituted misfeasance and was actionable by
the Attorney General's office. While Miller involved public officials, it was not a
recall case.
97. Id. at 152, 201 P.2d at 138.
98. 80 Wash. 2d 121, 492 P.2d 536 (1972), overruled, Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280,
692 P.2d 799 (1984). In Brooks the court held that the busing plan was within the
discretion of the school board based on Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), a famous busing case in which the United States
Supreme Court stated that implementation of busing was within the discretion of
the school board. See State ex rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks,
80 Wash. 2d 124, 129, 492 P.2d 536, 541 (1972).
99. Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wash. 2d 268, 271, 693 P.2d 71, 73 (1984)(citations omitted).
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very few recall petitions had been found unsatisfactory by the courts.
In practice, the provisions requiring misconduct appeared no more re-
strictive than those allowing recall for any reason as long as the rea-
sons were clearly stated.
In an effort to further restrict recall, the Washington Legislature
amended its recall provisions on two separate occasions. The 1976
amendment added language that required a "detailed description, in-
cluding the approximate date, location and nature of each act com-
plained of."' ' 00 The second amendment, in 1984, added several new
requirements. First, it required a petitioner to "verify under oath that
he or she has knowledge of the alleged facts upon which the stated
grounds for recall are based."' 0 ' Second, it codified the case law defi-
nition of "misfeasance," "malfeasance," and "violation of the oath of
office."102 Third, it required the petitioner to file the petition with a
clerk who prepares a ballot synopsis and determines the sufficiency of
the charges. 03 Finally, the amendment described the duties of the
superior court in determining the sufficiency of the allegations.' 04
The amendment required the superior court to review the ballot sy-
nopsis and to hear arguments concerning the sufficiency of the allega-
tions. However, the 1984 amendment clearly stated that "the court
shall not consider the truth of the charges but only their
sufficiency."05
These legislative amendments enabled the Washington Supreme
Court to decide cases in accordance with legislative intent. In Chan-
dler v. Otto, the court stated: "We believe the changes indicate a legis-
lative intent to place limits on the recall right, i.e. to allow recall for
cause yet free public officials from the harassment of recall elections
grounded on frivolous charges or mere insinuations." 06
After these amendments, it seemed certain that judicial interven-
tion not only was justified, but required. Finally, with the support of
the legislature, the court's role in the political process was clearly
delineated.
In a case decided the same day as Chandler, the court in Cole v.
Webster,10l assumed its new power to review petitions and held a re-
call petition to be legally insufficient. In defending its dismissal of the
charges, the court noted that
these specificity requirements leave intact the inherent right of the people to
100. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.82.010 (1975).
101. WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 29.82.010 (1984).
102. See, eg., State v. Miller, 32 Wash. 2d 149, 151, 201 P.2d 136, 138 (1948)('Misfea-
sance means the performance of a duty a public officer in an improper manner").
103. Id.
104. Id. at 152, 201 P.2d at 138.
105. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.82.010 (1984)(amended 1976 and 1984).
106. Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wash. 2d 268, 274, 693 P.2d 71, 74 (1984).
107. 103 Wash. 2d 280, 691 P.2d 799 (1984).
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recall elected officials for cause. The only burden is that recall must be based
on specific and definite charges. This is not a cumbersome burden when one
considers the harassment to which public officials can be subject if charges
need only be general in nature.
1 0 8
The Cole court then obligatorily reminded that the recall is a political
process:
Our holding does not mean that courts have the authority to look at the truth-
fulness of the charges.... However, we believe the legislature intended to
limit the recall right by allowing courts to review the sufficiency of charges as
a matter of law and decide whether the facts, if true, establish a prima facie
act of misfeasance, malfeasance or violation of the oath of office. 1 0 9
The history of judicial review in the Washington recall process em-
phasizes the striking contrast between recall as a purely political pro-
cess, where any or no reason is sufficient, and recall that injects the
judiciary into the political process. While the Washington Supreme
Court stressed that only the electorate can determine the truthfulness
of the charges, the charges may never be brought before the people if
the courts find that they are legally insufficient. Under this system,
the voters may recall subject to close judicial scrutiny, a combination
which can blur the distinction between the political and judicial
processes. However, this blurring should not necessarily be viewed as
negative. Perhaps judicial incorporation into the model is nothing
more than a modification of the recall process made necessary by the
increasingly complex nature of the representative process.
Indeed, politics are more complex and affect more people than ever
before. The representative system requires growth and change due to
the unprecedented growth of our society. The same growth which cre-
ated the demand for recall in the early twentieth century also fuels
the movement for narrowing and distinguishing the requirements of
the recall process. When the recall statutes are refined and
redeveloped, recall will be an available political tool that cannot be
abused by the electorate.
B. Nebraska: A Need for Change
Due to what has been termed "recall frenzy," the Nebraska Legis-
lature considered two recall reform bills during the 1988 session.1 1 0
At present, Nebraska's recall statute has no provisions that require a
statement of the allegations against the targeted official.n11 The lack
of a "cause" requirement has been cited as the root of the recall
frenzy. According to Cynthia Johnson-Howard, legal counsel to the
108. Id. at 285, 692 P.2d at 803 (citation omitted)(citing WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 33, 34).
109. Id. at 287, 692 P.2d at 804.
110. L.B. 1166, 90th Leg., 2d Sess. (1988); L.B. 1167, 90th Leg., 2d Sess. (1988)(these
bills were indefinitely postponed, however, similar legislation has been intro-
duced in the first session of the ninety-first Legislature).
111. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1403 (1988).
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Committee on Government, Military and Veteran's Affairs for the
State of Nebraska, the bills' purposes are to make recalls less arbitrary
and to remove the recall as an alternative to the referendum.112 The
recall, she explained, is not the time to let the official know how the
voters feel about an issue.1 13 The new measures, if successful, will re-
strict the recall process and will remove recall from its single-issue
orientation.
Specifically, the new bills provide additional requirements for re-
call petition papers, qualifications for those who circulate the petition,
and penalties for those petitioners who fail to comply with the stat-
ute.n 4 In addition, the bills propose a requirement for a one hundred
word statement indicating a reason or reasons for the recall. "The
statement shall include an example or examples of the action or be-
havior for which the official is sought to be recalled.""1 5 Explicitly
stating that discretionary acts should not form the basis for a recall
attempt, the bills also include a requirement that "[iln no case shall
any vote cast by any official as a member of any governing body.., be
included as a reason for a recall attempt."' 6 Such a showing of cause
indeed will remove the referendum-like qualities from the recall
process.
Despite Nebraska's move to make recall more difficult, its
lawmakers still balk at allowing the judiciary to assume any affirma-
tive role in the process. As Ms. Johnson-Howard stated in describing
the benefits and concerns of including a causation requirement and its
potential for appeal to a state court:
In deciding which course to take on this issue, the committee needs to consider
that the further you go towards the simplistic solution, the less you affect the
system as it is functioning now (this may be a pro or a con, depending on how
you look at it). On the other hand, the more you tend toward a more legalistic
solution-which has the advantage of truly making petition drives more ac-
countable, the more you risk involving the judiciary system in the process.117
The bills attempt to address this fear of the "evil" judiciary interfering
with the political process. Rather than judicial review, the bills pro-
vide for "filing clerk review."1 s The filing clerk will review the suffi-
ciency of the allegations with an appeal of the filing clerk's
determination to the Secretary of State. Such a process ignores the
judiciary as the mediator among various interests and presumes that a
112. Telephone Interview with Cynthia Johnson-Howard, Legal Counsel to the Com-
mittee on Government, Military and Veteran's Affairs for the State of Nebraska
(Jan. 21, 1988)[hereinafter Interview].
113. Id.
114. L.B. 1167, § 3, 90th Leg., 2d Sess. (1988).
115. L.B. 1166, § 1, 90th Leg., 2d Sess. (1988).
116. Id.
117. Memorandum from Cynthia Johnson-Howard to the Committee on Government,
Military and Veteran's Affairs for the State of Nebraska (Nov. 24, 1987).
118. L.B. 1166, § 1, 90th Leg., 2d Sess. (1988).
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filing clerk effectively can guard the targeted official's interests. As a
result of the fear of involving the judiciary in the political process, the
Nebraska bills have given too much power to an individual who may
lack the expertise to analyze the application. Unlike the clerks, the
courts regularly deal with questions of factual and legal sufficiency.
Furthermore, a court, as a tribunal, will provide a fairer forum than a
single-member panel composed only of the filing clerk or the Secre-
tary of State.119
IV. BEYOND NEBRASKA: WHAT REFORMS
ARE NECESSARY?120
To ensure that recall remains the pillar of representative democ-
racy without destroying a public official's ability to work effectively,
legislative reforms of the recall process are necessary. First, all recall
statutes should require a strong showing of cause related to the public
servant's official duties and specifically exclude acts of discretion asso-
ciated with the office.'2 1 Such a showing of cause should be review-
able for sufficiency in the state courts.122  Second, signature
requirements should be changed so that recalls are neither too diffi-
cult nor too simple to bring about.12 3 Third, legislatures should im-
pose a requirement of good faith knowledge concerning the truth of
the allegations asserted, made valid through a sworn statement. 12 Fi-
nally, statutory reform should include mandatory criminal sanctions
imposed on petitioners 2 5 who knowingly circulate a recall petition
with false allegations.1 2 6
By protecting the targeted official along with the electorate, recall
reform will protect the system of representative government as a
whole. The ultimate aim of recall reform is to protect the smooth
functioning of government without ignoring the interests of the vot-
ers. Removing the threat of arbitrary recalls will better ensure that
an official's primary focus will be on the effective administration of
government.
A. Role of the Judiciary
In a majority of states with recall statutes, the judiciary has demon-
119. Similar legislation is pending and further amendments may include tightening
the "cause" requirements with judicial review.
120. See infra Appendix.
121. See in fra Appendix § 17-020.
122. See infra Appendix § 17-150.
123. See infra Appendix § 17-050.
124. See infra Appendix § 17-030(3).
125. The term "petitioner" is used interchangeably with the term "sponsor" used in
the Appendix.
126. See infra Appendix § 17-030(3).
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strated a marked reluctance to assert itself in preventing abuse of re-
call by the electorate. 127 While recall is part of the political process,
the judiciary should be allowed to ensure that the interests of the peo-
ple are not in conflict with the interests of the targeted public official
and, therefore, of the smooth functioning of government. When the
judiciary summarily dismisses intervention as an encroachment on the
political process, it denies its role as a mediator between competing
interests. By reviewing the sufficiency of recall allegations, a court is
not necessarily lawmaking or threatening the delicate balance of the
separation of powers.
Of course, many state courts are stymied by the vague language of
recall statutes. When a legislature does not require a showing of
cause, a court cannot broadly interpret recall provisions without being
accused of lawmaking. But simply because a court may not have the
power to intervene, does not mean that abuse of the recall does not
exist. Because recall is subject to abuse, and because the court often is
unable to act to exercise review, reform that will create safeguards is
necessary.
A universal requirement of a showing of cause with appeal to the
state's superior court will force the courts to review the sufficiency of
the allegations. Such a reform will make recall a more effective tool
of democracy. It will provide for the removal of public officials who
no longer meet the expectations of office without subjecting effective
public servants to the harassment and expense of battling recall cam-
paigns. When recalls are used for their intended purpose, government
works more effectively for the people, but when public officials are
constantly concerned with arbitrary recall campaigns, the workings of
a representative government may be brought to a standstill.
Determining what allegations are sufficient may be difficult. The
courts also need guidelines indicating what should be considered suffi-
cient cause. The few states which already require a showing of cause
have concluded that an official may be removed for a variety of often
vague reasons including "misfeasance," "malfeasance," "violation of
the oath of office," and "incompetence."'M2
These vague terms are difficult to define and may allow recall for
any reason if interpreted to their extremes. However, normal exer-
cises of discretion should not constitute sufficient cause.12 9 If the vot-
ers do not like a given discretionary act, they may vote the official out
of office at the next regular election. Thus, an action such as a partic-
ular vote on an issue could not be declared an act of incompetence
127. See, eg., supra notes 80-109 and accompanying text.
128. Id.
129. See State ex rel Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d 121,
492 P.2d 536 (1972), overruled, Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280, 692 P.2d 799
(1984).
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sufficient to warrant recall.130
On the other hand, if the petitioner can demonstrate that the offi-
cial acted in contravention to the good of the people she or he repre-
sents, or that the official has broken the law while in office,31 then
the courts should find cause, and recall should be allowed. Further-
more, by specifically excluding discretionary acts,1 3 2 single issues
rarely will constitute sufficient cause. Instead, a petitioner must
demonstrate that an official has repeatedly violated promises and has
offended the electorate in order to meet the cause requirement.1 33
Some critics suggest that a review of the sufficiency of recall peti-
tion allegations wastes the court's time. They recommend that the
municipal clerk could manage the same review because a determina-
tion of the truth of the allegations ultimately will be the public's re-
sponsibility. The difficulty with permitting the clerk to determine
sufficiency is that such review fails to provide the same protection to
the targeted official that the judiciary would provide.134
Unfortunately, sometimes a showing of cause is not enough to pro-
tect a public official from abuse. In order to further protect the
targeted official, some critics would have a court determine whether
the allegations themselves are true.135 When the court reviews the
truth of the allegations, the electorate will be almost entirely removed
from the recall process. If a court determines that the allegations are
true, then having a recall election seems merely obligatory-only se-
mantically distinct from judicial removal. However, by allowing the
people to determine the truth of the allegations and by allowing them
130. See infra Appendix § 17-020(2).
131. See infra Appendix § 17-020 for definitions of "misfeasance," "malfeasance," and
"violation of the oath of office." Furthermore, the model statute uses the word
"includes" in order to bring in actions that may not be illegal per se but could be
considered an act in contravention of the good of the people.
132. For example, an attempted recall of San Francisco Mayor Diane Feinstein in
April 1983 was based on a single issue: possession of handguns. Feinstein pushed
through an ordinance banning possession of guns. While the law never went into
effect because the courts determined that only the state may regulate handguns,
it provided ample basis for a recall drive. Anyone for Mayor-baiting?, ECONo-
MIST, April 16, 1983, at 45-46.
133. Governor Evan Mecham of Arizona, provides a good example of repeated of-
fenses (including a six-count felony indictment) leading to a recall election. The
Governor was ultimately impeached before the recall election occurred. Mecham
Is Eager For Trial In Senate, The Dallas Morning News, Feb. 7,1988, at 41A, col.
1.
134. See supra notes 110-119 and accompanying text.
135. In Brocek v. Bayley, 81 Wash. 2d 831, 505 P.2d 814 (1973) (Utter, J., concurring),
overruled, Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280, 692 P.2d 799, 804 (1984), Judge Utter
stated that "if a petitioner phrases a cause correctly, a vote on recall will occur
regardless of whether actual cause on the issues stated exists and whether there
is in fact, any truth to the charge.... I cannot believe that this was the intent of
the original drafters."
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to register their assessment of the allegations by voting, the legislature
rightfully permits an informed, educated electorate to control its rep-
resentative government. The risk that a showing of cause or of suffi-
ciency of the allegations does not afford elected officials enough
protection is simply a risk that a democracy must take in order to en-
sure that the people are not deprived of their effective participation in
the workings of the government. 3 6
B. Signature Requirements
The signature requirements vary from state to state and can affect
the ability of the voters to recall officials. For example, the Washing-
ton statewide recall statutes require that petitions contain legally suf-
ficient signatures equal to at least twenty-five percent of the votes cast
for all candidates who ran for the targeted official's office in the prior
election.137 However, Washington requires thirty-five percent for
some local officials. The North Dakota Constitution requires that a
recall petition be signed by at least twenty-five percent of the number
of voters in the last gubernatorial election in the district from which
the targeted officer is to be recalled.'3 8 And in Georgia, the signature
requirement for some state officers is fifteen percent of the registered
voters at the most recent general election for the office held by the
targeted official.'39 For other state officers and local officials in Geor-
gia, the signature requirement increases to thirty percent. 40 Louisi-
ana will not permit a statewide recall with less than one-third of the
total electors in the voting area for which the recall is petitioned, and
if the area has less than one thousand voters, the requirement in-
creases to two-fifths.i4i
Differences in the signature requirement can either prohibit a re-
call or greatly simplify the process of removing a public official
through recall. A signature requirement that is too high will prohibit
the electorate from bringing about a recall election. But if a signature
requirement falls below an acceptable floor, recall campaigns may too
easily and arbitrarily turn into harassing and expensive recall elec-
tions. Overzealous recall can impede the smooth functioning of
government.
The most permissive signature requirement permits a recall with
136. But see Robbins, Omaha Mayor Battling on Eve of Recall Vote, N.Y. Times, Jan.
13, 1987, at A16, col. 4 (quoting Sam Jenson). "The problem with letting the elec-
torate decide is that the people most likely to vote are the people who think [the
targeted official] is a bad person."
137. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 29.82.060(1) (1965).
138. N.D. CONST. art. HI, § 10.
139. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-4-4(a)(1) (1982).
140. Id. § 2144(a)(2).
141. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1300.2(B) (West Supp. 1988).
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only five percent of the voters' signatures.142 At the opposite extreme,
some statutes require forty percent of the voters to register their as-
sent.143 In states that base the signature requirement on the number
of people who voted in a given election, a light voter turnout allows a
sufficient number of signatures to be obtained with relative ease.
States basing the signature requirement on the number of registered
voters have the strictest signature requirement because the number of
registered voters is inevitably higher than the number of actual voters
in any election.14
In order to ensure a recall drive that is fair to both the electorate
and the targeted public official, all recall statutes should base the sig-
nature requirements on a percentage of registered voters, not on a per-
centage of people voting in a given election.145 If the signature
requirement is too low, a minority will control the elections. Because
recall was originally instituted by the Progressives in an effort to end
minority control of representative government, to oversimplify the
process would violate the intent of its creators.146 In the same manner
that turn-of-the-century public representatives were beholden to the
will of the large corporation, public officials who are subject to easy
recall are beholden to the will of varying minority factions. While this
proposal will increase the difficulty of getting a recall election in some
locales, it will decrease the likelihood that a public official will be
harassed by a small minority of the electorate.
C. Good Faith Requirement
Because most statutes do not look to the sufficiency of the allega-
tions, petitioners are not held accountable for statements that they
make on the recall petition. Petitioners should be held accountable,
and statutes should require that petitioners not only identify them-
selves,147 but also that they certify under the penalty of perjury that
the facts they are alleging are, to the best of their knowledge, true.148
If a petitioner knowingly rests a recall campaign on false allegations,
she or he will be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by criminal
sanctions.
Reducing the likelihood of a recall petition based on false allega-
142. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.361(1)(a)(6) (1983).
143. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4311 (1986).
144. See generally Fossey, Meiners v. Bering Strait School District and the Recall of
Public Officers: A Proposal For Legislative Reform, 2 ALAsKA L. REV. 41, 46
(1985).
145. See infra Appendix § 17-050 which provides for signatures from twenty percent
of all registered voters in a given area. Twenty percent will not be prohibitive yet
will demand hard work from petitioners.
146. See supra notes 1-22 and accompanying text.
147. See infra Appendix § 17-030(1)(a).
148. See infra Appendix § 17-030(3).
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tions ensures the integrity of the recall. Once a recall petition that is
based on false allegations is circulated, it becomes difficult, if not im-
possible, to determine how many of the signatures were obtained
based on the false allegations.' 49 While several current statutes per-
mit the targeted official to respond to allegations on the recall bal-
lot,150 such a statement will not combat already ingrained perceptions
of misdeeds.151
Requiring that motives of recall petitioners be reviewed would be
difficult, but legislative reform that would require good faith knowl-
edge of the facts on which the allegations are based is reasonable. The
least that we can expect from those who seek to recall a properly
elected official is an honest belief in their own allegations.
Thus, the requirement of a sworn statement by the petitioner, com-
bined with the ability of the state courts to review the sufficiency of
the allegations, will decrease the likelihood of abuse of recall. Recall
petitioners will be required to stand behind their allegations.
Targeted public officials can request review of the allegations in the
state superior court. Because there will be a heavy burden on the pub-
lic official to prove that she or he should not withstand the recall elec-
tion, the political process will not be encumbered by overzealous
intervention by the judiciary. 52 Furthermore, the public will be en-
trusted with the most important duty of all- voting on their belief in
the truth of the allegations asserted.
V. CONCLUSION
Recalls of local government officials are more and more common.
Increasingly, citizens are using recall campaigns both to rid them-
selves of an unwanted official and to threaten an official without actu-
ally removing him or her from office. While recalls are a healthy sign
of a dynamic representative democracy, such power in the hands of
the electorate is not without its disadvantages. Impassioned voters can
use recall as an arbitrary means of harassment, stifling the proper
workings of government.
In order to maintain recall as a useful tool of democracy without
threatening the proper and necessary workings of government, recall
must be reformed. A recall must be based on a sufficient showing of
cause with a right of appeal to the state court. Recall statutes should
impose sanctions on those who knowingly file recall petitions based on
false allegations. Moreover, signature requirements should be based
149. See generally Fossey, supra note 144.
150. See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 306.060(1) (1987).
151. See iqfta Appendix § 17-040(1).
152. See generally Fossey, supra note 144, at 68.
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on the number of registered voters in a given area, not on the number
of people voting in a previous election.
While recall is important for democracy, it can be abused. These
proposals, in the first instance, will prevent unnecessary recall cam-
paigns. Second, the reforms will provide targeted officials, like Ash-
land Mayor Sherilyn Moore,153 with the substantive allegations
against them. It is important that voters maintain their populist senti-
ments, but not at the expense of destroying representative
government.
The right of recall is a privilege that protects the voters from living
with costly electoral mistakes. Recall reform is necessary to protect
elected officials from the arbitrary exercise of that privilege.
Elizabeth E. Mack* '88
153. Supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
* B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., Harvard Law School. The author is cur-
rently a judicial clerk to the Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Texas.
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VI. APPENDIX15
Legislative Proposal: Article 17. Recall155
Sec. 17-010. RECALL. Every public official who is elected or ap-
pointed to an elected municipal office may be recalled by the voters
after the official has served the first 6 (six) months of the term for
which he or she was elected or appointed. An official may not be sub-
ject to recall within 6 (six) months of the expiration of his or her term
in office.
Sec. 17-020. GROUNDS FOR RECALL. (1) Grounds for recall are
misfeasance, incompetence or violation of the oath of office during the
term of office that the official is presently serving-
(a) Misfeasance includes an unlawful act committed willfully by
an elected public official;
(b) incompetence includes mental or physical incapacity of an of-
ficial to perform the duties of office for a period of no less than 45
(forty-five) days;
(c) violation of the oath of office includes the willful neglect or
failure of an official to perform faithfully a duty required by statute.
(2) Performance of a lawful discretionary act in accordance with the
official's oath of office does not constitute a basis for recall.
Sec. 17-030. APPLICATION FOR RECALL PETITION. (1) An ap-
plication for a recall petition shall be filed with the municipal or vil-
lage clerk and shall include:
(a) the signatures and resident addresses of at least 5 (five) regis-
tered municipal voters who will sponsor the petition;
(b) the address to which all correspondence relating to the peti-
tion may be sent; and
(c) a statement in 200 (two hundred) words or less of the grounds
for the recall, stated with specificity.
(2) No county recorder, justice of the peace, registration officer or
other person authorized by law to register electors and no person
other than a qualified elector shall be allowed to sponsor a petition.
(3) Each sponsor of an application for a recall petition shall certify
under penalty of perjury that the sponsor believes the charges set
forth in the application for the recall petition are true. Knowingly
154. This model statute is a combination of various state recall statutes including those
of Alaska, Arizona, California, Nebraska, and Washington. The numbers do not
intentionally correspond to any particular state statute. See generally Fossey,
supra note 144, at 71-75.
155. This is a proposal for reform of municipal recall. Reform for statewide offices
would be substantially the same except that the filings would be made with the
Secretary of State's office and not the municipal or village clerk, and the
signature requirement for a statewide recall would be 15 (fifteen) percent of all
registered voters in the state.
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submitting a false statement in an application for a recall petition
shall be punishable as a Class I misdemeanor.
(4) Additional sponsors may be added by amending the application to
include their names. Each additional sponsor shall be required to
comply with subsections (1), (2) and (3) of this section.
Sec. 17-040. RECALL PETITION. (1) If the municipal or village
clerk determines that an application for recall petition meets the re-
quirements of §§ 17-020 and 17-030, the clerk shall send, within 24
(twenty-four) hours, by certified mail, a copy of the application for
recall petition to the targeted official along with a notice informing
the official that the official may submit to the clerk a rebuttal state-
ment of 200 (two hundred) words or less no later than 10 (ten) days
after receipt of the petition's statement of grounds.
(2) When the 10 (ten) day rebuttal period has passed, the municipal
clerk shall prepare a recall petition. All copies of the petition shall
include:
(a) the name of the targeted official;
(b) the office of the targeted official;
(c) the 200 (two hundred) word statement of the grounds for re-
call as set out in the application for recall;
(d) the official's rebuttal statement if one was submitted in ac-
cordance with the subsection (1);
(e) the date the petition is issued by the clerk;
(f) notice that the signatures must be secured within 30 (thirty)
days;
(g) spaces for each signature, the printed name of each signer, the
date of the signature, and the residence and mailing address of each
signer;
(h) a statement, with a space for the sponsor's sworn signature
and date of signing, that the sponsor personally circulated the petition,
that all signatures were affixed in the presence of the sponsor, and
that the sponsor believes the signatures to be those of the persons
whose names they purport to be and that such sponsor has not re-
ceived and will not receive (either directly or indirectly) any compen-
sation for circulating such petition or for procuring signatures thereto;
and
(i) space for indicating the number of signatures on the petition.
(3) Copies of the petition shall be provided to each sponsor by the
clerk. The city clerk shall keep a sufficient number of such blank pe-
titions on file for distribution.
Sec. 17-050. SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS. (1) The signatures
on a recall petition shall be secured within 30 (thirty) days after the
date the clerk issues the petition. The statement provided under § 17-
040(2)(h) shall be completed and signed by the sponsor. All signatures
shall be in ink.
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(2) The clerk shall determine the number of signatures required on a
petition and inform each sponsor. The number of signatures shall
equal 20 (twenty) percent of the registered voters in the municipality.
(3) All signatures must be legible or accompanied by a legibly
printed name.
(4) A signer may withdraw his or her signature upon filing an affida-
vit affirming the affiant's intention to withdraw his or her signature
with the clerk before certification of the petition. Any signature so
withdrawn shall not be counted in determining the legal sufficiency of
the petition.
Sec. 17-060. SUFFICIENCY OF PETITION. (1) The copies of the
petition shall be assembled and filed as a single document. Within 10
(ten) days after the date a petition is filed the municipal or village
clerk shall:
(a) certify on the petition whether it is sufficient; and
(b) if the petition is insufficient, identify the insufficiency and no-
tify the sponsors within 24 (twenty-four) hours of the determination
of the insufficiency at the address provided in § 17-030(1)(b) by certi-
fied mail.
(2) An insufficient petition may be amended once to correct the in-
sufficiency within 10 (ten) days after the date on which the petition
was declared insufficient.
Sec. 17-070. NEW RECALL PETITION APPLICATION. If an ap-
plication is deemed insufficient and if the application is not amended
as required by § 17-060(2), a new application for a petition to recall the
same official may not be filed sooner than 6 (six) months after a previ-
ous petition is rejected as insufficient.
Sec. 17-080. REAPPORTIONMENT. If, due to reapportionment,
the boundaries of the district change, the recall procedure and special
election shall apply to the registered voters in the new district.
Sec. 17-090. SUBMITTING THE PETITION. (1) If a recall petition
is declared sufficient by the municipal or village clerk, the clerk shall
submit it to the governing body at the next regular meeting or at a
special meeting held before the next regular meeting.
(2) The municipal or village clerk will notify the targeted official
that the recall petitions are sufficient by certified mail the same day as
the meeting of the governing body to which the recall petitions will be
submitted.
Sec. 17-100. ELECTION. (1) If the targeted official does not resign
within 7 (seven) days of notice of the sufficiency of the recall petitions,
and if a regular election occurs within 75 (seventy-five) days but not
sooner than 30 (thirty) days after submission of the petition to the
governing body, the governing body may provide for the recall vote at
the regular election.
(2) If no regular election occurs within 75 (seventy-five) days, the
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governing body shall hold a special election on a recall question within
60 (sixty) days but not sooner than 30 (thirty) days after a petition is
submitted to the governing body.
See. 17-110. FORM OF RECALL BALLOTS. A recall ballot shall
include:
(a) the grounds for the recall election as stated in 200 (two hun-
dred) words or less on the recall petition;
(b) the rebuttal statement of the targeted official if one is pro-
vided in accordance with § 17-040(1);
(c) the following question: "Shall (name of person) be recalled
from the office of (name of office)? Yes [ No [ Please mark the
appropriate box with an 'X' mark."; and
(d) the statement: "A 'Yes' vote means that you are in favor of
removing (name of person) from the office of (name of office) for the
remainder of his or her term of office. A 'No' vote means that you
would like (name of person) to remain in the office of (name of
office)."
Sec. 17-120. EFFECT OF RECALL ELECTION. (1) If a majority
favors recall, the office becomes vacant upon certification of the recall
election.
(2) If the targeted official is not recalled, such official may continue
in office, subject to further recall as provided in §§ 17-010 to 17-130.
Sec. 17-130. NEW RECALL PETITIONS. If a targeted official is not
recalled, no recall petition shall be filed against that official within 6
(six) months after the recall election failed to remove him or her from
office.
Sec. 17-140. ELECTION OF SUCCESSOR. (1) If the voters recall
an official, the municipal or village clerk shall conduct an election for
a successor to fill the unexpired term. The election shall be held at
least 15 (fifteen) but not more than 45 (forty-five days) from the date
of certification of the recall election.
(2) Nominations for a successor may be filed until 7 (seven) days
before the last date on which a first notice of the election must be
given. Nominations may not be filed before the certification of the
recall election.
(3) The recalled officer may not seek re-election for the unexpired"
term of the office from which he or she was recalled.
Sec. 17-150. JURISDICTION OF THE COUNTY COURT. (1) Any
person aggrieved by the filing of recall charges or by the failure of an
election official to perform duties in relation to the recall, may file an
action in the County Court for the county in which the recall petition
was filed. On hearing such action, the Court shall consider the
following:
(a) the sufficiency or specificity of such recall charge or charges;
and
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(b) the issuance of an injunction to compel performance of any
act required of the municipal or village clerk or other elected official
in relation to recall, or to prevent the performance of an act by the
municipal clerk or other elected official in relation to recall.
(2) Any actions pursuant to subsection (a) of this statute shall be
commenced no later than 10 (ten) days from the date that the targeted
official received a copy of the statement of grounds for recall from the
municipal or village clerk pursuant § 17-040(1). Any action pursuant
to subsection (b) of this section shall be commenced within 10 (ten)
days from the time the complaint arises.
